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ABSTRACT

The Massachusetts Chapter 91 Waterways Program is a licensing
program through which the Commonwealth carries out its
responsibilities under the Public Trust Doctrine.

It was

unclear when this study was undertaken whether public
participation in the program development process resulted
in a different program than the draft program the state
originally proposed in 1986.

This qualitative case study

was developed based on hundreds of pages of letters, comments
and testimony from the public, press clippings and interviews.
The primary finding is that public participation, particularly
from so-called special interest groups, resulted in a final
program which was significantly different from the 1986 Draft
Program which was developed without public input.
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PREFACE

This thesis is prepared according to the Manuscript Format,
whereby the first part of the paper contains the text, and the
second part contains the notes and bibliography.
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INTRODUCTION

The interface of sea and land -- the shore -- is the setting for a dynamic interaction of uses, laws, and living
things.

The myriad of activities which occur in the shore has

spawned, over time, the development of management and legal
tools.

One such tool is the Public Trust Doctrine, an ancient

idea which has been given new life and vigor by many states in
the latter half of the twentieth century.
The Public Trust Doctrine is the fundamental legal principle which gives states the responsibility to manage trust
lands, waters and certain resources with special care. 1

A

national study of the Doctrine, pUblished in November 1990,
defines the principle this way:
The Public Trust Doctrine provides that title to tidal and
navigable freshwaters, the lands beneath, as well as the living resources inhabiting these waters within a state is a
special title.
It is held by the state in trust for the
benefit of the public, and establishes the right of the public to use and enjoy these trust waters, lands and resources
for a wide variety of recognized pUblic uses. 2
While the Doctrine as a legal principle is recognized by the
coastal states, lithe Public Trust Doctrine is not selfexecuting.

Even a jUdicially well-articulated Public Trust

Doctrine is of limited value if there is no state official or
agency empowered to implement and enforce it." 3

To fully meet

their responsibilities, states must bring the Doctrine to a
new level -- implementation through regulation of trust lands
and waters.
Because the states, and not the federal government, are
empowered to admininster pUblic tidal and submerged lands, the

Public Trust Doctrine is a doctrine of state law. 4

Thus from

colonial times to the present, various state courts have
offered a myriad of views on which lands and which pUblic
rights are protected under the Doctrine. 5

In colonial times

filling and building in harbors was encouraged, since coastal
states believed the best use of submerged and tidal lands was
their development for trade and navigation. 6

The trend in the

twentieth century has been a shift from encouraging development of trust lands to controlling and even limiting their
development.

The Public Trust Doctrine, then, is flexible

because "it is the social value of the uses to which the public has put the land, rather than the nature of the land
itself, which determines the existence of public trust.,,7
Changes in our social values this century have brought a new
perspective on the Public Trust Doctrine.

Demand for recre-

ational uses of the coastline is high,8 while increasing
population and development pressures are chipping away at
access to the shoreline. 9 Private and public users compete for
a fixed amount of shoreline.

The resultant tension must be

addressed by the state through laws and regulations.

At this

point in the evolution of the management of our coastal
resources, it is unclear how states should proceed from jUdicial directive to regulation of public trust lands.
Massachusetts was at a crossroads in coastal management
in 1979, when the Supreme Judicial Court handed down a landmark decision on the Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts -Boston Waterfront Development corporation v. Commonwealth. 1 0
Pursuant to this case, the legislature amended Chapter 91 of
2

the Massachusetts General Laws -- the waterways statute -- in
1983 and again in 1986.

The amendments directed the Depart-

ment of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE), with the
help of the Coastal Zone Management office (CZM) , to overhaul
its regulatory program to incorporate the changes to Chapter
91.

Developing a new Chapter 91 Regulatory Program turned out

to be an arduous and controversial process for the state.

The

Massachusetts program, called "an ambitious experiment to protect and expand pUblic access to the coast" by one observer,
11 illustrates the tensions between private and pUblic users
of the coastal zone.

This paper is a case study of the Massa-

chusetts Chapter 91 program, a case which "provides an example
that may prove instructive to other states.,,12
statement of the Problem and Hypotheses

It was unclear when this study was undertaken whether public
participation in shaping new regulations resulted in a different program, compromised by the strident opposition of special
interest groups such as marinas, yacht clubs and developers.
The central issue is whether the program was revised because
of the pUblic controversy over the new Chapter 91 waterways
Program.
Hypotheses

The following are the three hypotheses to be tested in this
study:
1. Widespread pUblic criticism caused the state to significantly revise the original draft of Chapter 91 regulations.
2. The widespread pUblic criticism of the first draft came
primarily from special interests such as marinas and devel3

opers, with little participation by groups representing the
general pUblic.
3. The final Chapter 91 Regulations, which include several
major changes from the first draft of the regulations, are
significantly different than the first draft in protecting
the general pUblic's interests in trust lands in Massachusetts.

Methodology
The qualitative case study as described in Merriam's Case
study Research in Education: A Qualitative Approach (1988)13
is the method used to test the hypotheses.

This method suits

a study of the dynamic interaction between a large number of
participants over the seven years of program development
within a specific context (Massachusetts).

Most importantly,

some generalizations are made in the discussion chapter which
may be useful to other coastal states such as Rhode Island.
The qualitative case study was chosen because
"[g]eneralizations, concepts, or hypotheses emerge from an
examination of the data --data grounded in the context
itself.,,14
Before undertaking the qualitative case study, the
researcher must identify the boundaries of the system.

In

this case, after an introductory review of the history of the
public trust doctrine in Massachusetts and the events that led
up to 1986, the starting point of the case is the submission
of Draft waterways Regulations for public comment in December
1986. The end of the process, or system, is October 1990, when
4

the final regulations were promulgated.
The primary source of data for this study was files of
the state of Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (formerly the DEQE), Division of Wetlands and Waterways.
This agency developed the regulations and presently administers the Chapter 91 program.

Several hundred pages of written

comment in the form of personal and form letters as well as
page-by-page reviews of the draft regulations are on file and
available to researchers.

Newspaper articles were closely

reviewed in order to determine which groups had the most
influence on the program development process.

Personal and

telephone interviews with key players in the process also provided data for the study.

The data culled from these sources

were woven together to create a narrative of the case.
Chapter One briefly reviews the Public Trust Doctrine in
light of unique legal developments in Massachusetts.

This

chapter is meant to provide a basic understanding of this cornerstone of the Chapter 91 waterways Program.

Chapter Two

discusses the historic changes in Massachusetts case and statutory law which spurred the call for reform of the waterways
Regulatory Program.

Chapter Three examines the key partici-

pants in the pUblic comment period and their influence on the
DEQE.

Finally, Chapters Four and Five analyze and discuss the

implications of the data presented in Chapters One, Two and
Three.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN MASSACHUSETTS
The Evolution of the Doctrine in the U.S.
The Public Trust Doctrine has been extensively analyzed
by legal scholars and coastal zone specialists alike. 1 It is
not within the scope of this paper to exhaustively trace the
evolution of the Doctrine.

However a brief overview will add

understanding to the doctrine of Massachusetts, on which the
Chapter 91 program is based.
The roots of the Public Trust Doctrine as it exists in
Massachusetts are found in ancient times.

The Romans devel-

oped this common law doctrine because they believed that the
coastline and the sea were resources common to all.

This

belief was embodied in the Institutes of Justinian, ancient
Rome's legal code, which reads in part:
By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind
--air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of
the sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the
seashore, provided that he respects habitations, monuments
and the buildings, which are not, like the sea, sUbject only
to the law of nations. 2
During the Middle Ages commerce and navigation diminished in
importance. 3

In England, the doctrine crumbled as the King

allowed feudal lords to claim ownership of the adjacent
shore. 4 The public trust doctrine survived, nevertheless, and
new life was breathed into it after the signing of the Magna
Carta in 1215. 5
England tailored the Doctrine according to its needs,
and so it evolved from the ancient Roman version.

According

to the English law, title to all tidal waters and the lands

6

beneath them had two concurrent elements: the jus pUblicum
and the jus privatum. 6

The jus publicum, the public's rights

of use, were held by the King in trust for the English
people.

The jus privatum, the private rights of ownership

and exclusion, were also held by the King.

Eventually the

doctrine evolved so that the while the King retained the jus
privatum in tidal and submerged lands, the Parliament held
the jus publicum in trust for the pUblic. 7
The American colonies inherited the Public Trust Doctrine from England.

According to the united states Supreme

court the common law of England became the common law of the
united states "except so far as it has been modified by the
charters, constitutions, statutes or usages of the several
Colonies and States, or by the Constitution and the laws of
the united States"8

The states have gone on to develop

different forms of the doctrine tailored to their particular
needs and interpretations, although there is a significant
body of federal case law guiding them. 9

origins of the Doctrine in Massachusetts

Massachusetts was the first state to codify the public
trust doctrine,10 but it has a checkered history of upholding
the doctrine in practice. In Massachusetts private property
extends to the extreme low tide mark.

This title was trans-

ferred wholesale by the 1647 Amendment to the Colonial Ordinance of 1641. 1 1 Title to tidal flats is held, in general, by
adjacent upland property owner subject to the reserved public
rights (an easement) to fish, fowl and navigate in privately
7

held tidelands. 1 2 Even though undeveloped private tidelands
are sUbject to reserved public uses, the courts have consistently ruled that "a littoral owner may build on his tidal
land so as to exclude the public completely as long as he
does not unreasonably interfere with navigation."13
The Colonial Ordinances of 1641-1647 were enacted to
stimulate water-borne commerce by encouraging private wharf
construction which the colony could not afford itself. 1 4.
The Ordinances extended private property to the low water
mark (or to 100 rods from the high water mark, whichever was
more landward) .15

section 3 of the Ordinance proclaimed:

It is declared, that in all creeks, coves, and other places
about or upon salt water where the sea ebbs and flows, the
proprietor of the land adjoining shall have propriety to the
low water mark, where the sea doth not ebb above a hundred
rods, and not more wheresoever it ebbs further;
Provided,
that such proprietor shall not by this liberty have power to
stop or hinder the pasage of boats or other vessels, in or
through any sea, creeks or coves, to other men's houses or
lands. 16
The colony thus traded its title to tidal flats to stimulate
maritime commerce and economic growth.

The courts, the sole

interpreter of the Ordinance until the 1860s (when the Board
of Harbor Commissioners was created by the legislature),
allowed construction and filling to the low water mark in
spite of the public's reserved rights in the tidelands. 1 7
Massachusetts went even further in burying the public's
trust rights during the 1800s.

During this period, the Gen-

eral Court 18 passed hundreds of special wharfing statutes
which granted to private property owners the right to extend
their wharves seaward of the low water line. 1 9

Now private

property owners could build wharves not only in the interti8

dal zone but also seaward of the low water line by obtaining
a special legislative grant.

The result was "a period of

intense and sustained maritime development during which large
tracts of tidal and submerged lands were reclaimed and developed by private parties."20
This trend of unregulated development of tidelands was
finally halted in 1866.

That year the General Court created

a permanent Board of Harbor Commissioners 2 1

The Board was

given licensing authority over all development in Commonwealth tidelands. 2 2
The scope of the pUblic's rights in tidal flats is narrow. The Massachusetts courts have been reluctant to expand
pUblic trust rights. 2 3

The reserved public rights in private

tidelands are fishing, fowling and navigation and their "natural derivatives"24

Derivative uses have been determined to

include swimming the waters without touching bottom,25 lateral access to fishing grounds,26 and taking floating plants
as long as they have not come to rest on the beach. 2 7

In

1974 the House of Representatives asked the Supreme Judicial
Court for an advisory opinion on a bill which would have
established a "a public on-foot right-of-passage" in tidal
flats. 2 8

The court rejected the reasoning behind the bill,

concluding that the proposed law would violate state and federal constitutional provisions against taking private property without fair compensation. 2 9

Massachusetts courts have

consistently rejected the idea that pUblic rights in tidal
flats have grown to encompass more than those reserved in
colonial times.

The Massachusetts view of the public trust
9

is vastly different than the view of New Jersey and California courts, which have expanded the scope of reserved rights
over time. 3 0

What is the effect of the Massachusetts approach?

The

private ownership of tidal flats is firmly grounded in its
history and law.

According to the Boston Globe, "The Bay

state's image as a serene setting to stroll sandy beaches is
a compelling one.

It is also a myth ...

Only 7 percent of

the state's shore is open to the public and suitable for
strolling or swimming. ,,31 Increasing public access by urging
the courts to expand the scope of the doctrine is unlikely.
Private ownership of tidal flats is likely to continue.

The

state must look for other ways to increase public access
besides challenging the considerable forces of history and
law in Massachusetts.

The Chapter 91 regulatory program is

one such way.

10

CHAPTER 2
THE 1980S: HISTORIC CHANGES IN CHAPTER 91 LAW

Despite the Supreme Judicial Court's narrow view of the
pUblic's rights in trust lands, the state recently implemented a sweeping tidelands licensing program called the
Chapter 91 Waterways Program.

Acrimonious debate marked the

years between the amendments to the waterways law, Chapter 91
of the Massachusetts General Code, and the final version of
the regulations.

The debate was spurred by a sweeping

Supreme Judicial Court ruling in 1979 that filled former
tidelands are still impressed with the pUblic trust, even
when they have been granted into private ownership.

The fol-

lowing chapter will discuss the evolution of tidelands
licensing in Massachusetts and the landmark Boston Waterfront
Corporation decision and its impact.

The Licensing and Development of Tidal Flats in Massachusetts

Although the Colonial Ordinances of 1641-1647 extended
private property to include tidal flats (private tidelands),
permission had to be obtained from the state to develop
them. 1

In addition, building or filling Commonwealth tide-

lands has always required the permission of the state.

The

ultimate responsibility for managing the pUblic trust lands
lies with the General Court, the Massachusetts legislature.
In the early years the General Court was directly involved in
tidelands licensing.

Prior to 1866 a riparian property owner

could develop adjacent tidelands lawfully only by obtaining a

11

special statute passed by the General Court.

These statutes,

known as wharfing statutes, generally granted a right to
build a wharf beyond the extreme low tide line and into Commonwealth tidelands.

Not only were private tidelands rapidly

developed in response to the Colonial Ordinances, Commonwealth tidelands were also being developed because of a legislature known to be generous with special wharfing statutes. 2
As a result, from colonial times until the early 1800s,
Massachusetts harbors teemed with wharves and commerce. 3 In
response to the explosion in development, the legislature
passed harbor line laws in 1837. 4 The new harbor lines were
challenged in court but withstood jUdicial scrutiny.5

The

Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) ruled in 1851 that building a
wharf in private tidelands is indeed subject to state regulation. 6
From this point on private tidelands (generally, the
intertidal zone) and Commonwealth tidelands (those sUbmerged
lands from the low water mark seaward to the limit of the
state's jurisdiction) were subject to regulation.

The harbor

line laws were codified and expanded in 1866 when the General
Court enacted Chapter 91 of the Massachusetts General Laws,
also known as the waterways statute. 7 Chapter 91 was the
first waterways licensing statute in the nation. 8

The legis-

lature also created a Board of Harbor Commission, thus delegating the legislative duty to regulate development in Commonwealth tidelands to the new agency.9

Licensing by the

Board was to replace special statutes granted by the legis la12

ture.

since 1866 the only substantial changes in the statu-

tory law came by way of amendments in 1983 and 1986. 1 0

Prior

to the 1980s amendments, if a proposed development was structurally sound and did not significantly interfere with navigation, license was granted. 1 1

After the 1983 and 1986

amendments, proposed projects had to meet greatly increased
substantive and procedural requirements. 1 2

The Boston Waterfront Decision: The SJC Turns Around
A 1979 decision by the Supreme Judicial court has had a
profound impact on tidelands law and policy in Massachusetts.
The case, Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth
(1979),13 turned existing tidelands regulation on its end.
In order to understand fully the impact of this decision,
some prior legal developments should be discussed.
Up until 1941, it was generally believed that licensed development of tidelands undertaken in good faith was "the equivalent of unconditional fee simple title,,14.
undermined by a judicial rUling in 1941.

This belief was
In the case, Com-

missioner of Public Works v. cities Service Oil Co.,15 the
SJC declared tidelands licenses revocable without compensation, despite development undertaken at great expense to
license holders.

The rUling suddenly cast into uncertainty

many developments whose tidelands licenses could be revoked
at any time without compensation.
This case prompted a new era in licensing: that of
"irrevocable licenses".16

In the wake of this decision,

developers feared the threat of revocation could jeopardize
13

not only existing development but also future financing of
new development. 17 Aware that the General Court was ultimately responsible for the disposition of Commonwealth tidelands, developers began to bypass the licensing agency by
requesting legislative declarations that their licenses were
irrevocable.

Many of these declarations "also provided for a

complete transfer of all rights, title and interest held by
the Commonwealth to the private parties in question -- the
most expansive transfer of public rights since the original
practice of land granting was discontinued in the
mid-1800s"18
The impact of this giveaway of Commonwealth tidelands
was far reaching.

During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s many

of the licenses issued under Chapter 91 were declared irrevocable by the General Court.

Developers and their lawyers

felt this was the only way to escape the threat of losing
their property to a license revocation and assure banks that
a project was financially viable.

According to one observer,

"In short, for almost two centuries the development taking
place along the shores of Massachusetts harbors -- albeit
'lawful' in most cases

buried not only large tracts of

land but also the notion that public rights in such lands
should be protected in perpetuity."19
Although the impact of the Commissioner of Public Works
v.

Cities Service Oil cities was devastating to the develop-

ment community, a 1979 case ultimately had more influence on
the way tidelands are used in Massachusetts.

The case, Bos-

ton Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth 2 0 pitted a
14

developer against the state.

The Boston Waterfront Develop-

ment corporation (BWDC) claimed ownership in fee simple absolute of a parcel of filled land located below the historic
extreme low water mark, in former Commonwealth tidelands.
BWDC asserted that its predecessor in title had been granted
fee simple absolute title by the Lewis Wharf statutes of the
early 1800s 2 1 prior to the enactment of Chapter 91 Waterways
Licensing statute in 1866.
The SJC ruled that indeed the Lewis Wharf statutes had
conveyed fee simple title to land below the extreme low water
mark; yet, that title was not absolute.

Instead, the grant

was burdened with the "condition sUbsequent" that the property be "used for the pUblic purpose for which it was
granted. ,,22

Furthermore, the SJC implied that the title

would revert back to the state if the parcel ceased being
used for that original public purpose. 2 3
The impact of the rUling was immediate.

The decision

"sent shockwaves throughout the Commonwealth's real property
industry. ,,24

From the perspective of the state the opinion

was a dramatic opportunity to increase public access to the
waterfront.

Hundreds of acres of filled lands could now be

brought under the Chapter 91 umbrella.

For the owners of

condominiums, restaurants, and office buildings built on
filled land the decision was a grave threat -- will the state
reclaim the wharves which are not being used for the original
public purpose? One MCZMP official wrote, "the Court was
clearly emphasizing the tenacity of the pUblic trust doctrine
over time; in establishing that protection of the public
15

interest in each parcel of tidelands is a perpetual responsibility of government, the SJC laid the foundation for wholesale change in the Commonwealth's program of waterways regulation n 2 5

The decision set the stage for a confrontation

between the state, representing the general pUblic's interest
in Commonwealth tidelands, and private property owners who
stood to lose thousands of dollars worth of waterfront
investment.
The enthusiasm of public access champions was dampened
two years later by the SJC's opinion of the Justices
(1981) .26 Following the Boston Waterfront Development
opinion, numerous bills were filed with the General court. 2 7
In response to one of these bills,28 the SJC issued this
advisory opinion in 1981 in order to clarify the public and
private rights in licensed tidelands.

The opinion of the

Justices to the Senate (1981) is viewed by some as a retreat
from the Boston Waterfront ruling. 2 9 The SJC ruled that
A further and significant limitation on legislative action
in the deposition of a pUblic asset is that the action must
be for a valid public purpose, and, where there may be
benefits to private parties, those private benefits must
not be primary but merely incidental to the achievement of
the public purpose ... The paramount test should be whether
expenditure confers a direct public benefit of a reasonably
general character, that is to say, to a significant part of
the PUblic as distinguished from a remote and theoretical
benefit. 113 6
In this rUling the SJC concluded that it is not constitutionally beyond the power of the legislature to extinguish the
pUblic interest in tidelands, although the standards which
any grant of public land must meet are stringent.

This rul-

ing was, then, a retreat from the Boston Waterfront decision,

16

which had implied that the pUblic interest in tidelands could
never be extinguished.

In the opinion of the Justices in

1981 any grant extinguishing the pUblic interest would have
to meet stiff requirements in order to pass muster with the
court. 3 1

Finally, the high court's 1981 rUling found that

the legislature could delegate its power to regulate tidelands. 3 2

The two rulings together clarified the the pUblic's

rights in all tidelands, whether they be former tidelands,
now filled and developed, or still flowed tidelands.
1983: Chapter 91 Amended

The stage then shifted from the court room to the floor
of the legislature.

The General Court now had to amend Chap-

ter 91 to incorporate the new rulings.

The SJC's 1979 and

1981 decisions prompted a Senate review of the the Chapter 91
statute. The Senate Committee on Ways and Means, responsible
for reviewing legislative proposals affecting pUblic lands in
the Commonwealth, published Policy Report #13: "Protection of
the Public Interest in Tidelands" in June, 1983. 3 3

The

report was issued because of "considerable divergence of
opinion on the part of various legislators, pUblic officials,
and private parties concerning the most appropriate legislative response" to the change in tidelands case law. 3 4
The Senate Report recommended that the Chapter 91 Statute, virtually unchanged since it was written in 1866, be
amended. The report made several recommendations to clarify
the existing statute in light of the recent jUdicial pronouncements on the Public Trust Doctrine.

17

Specific recommen-

dations were aimed at minimizing the discretion of the DEQE
in issuing licenses, creating specific statutory guidelines
for the Department, and making the license requirements more
predictable for applicants.
In response to the Senate report, the Boston Globe
pUblished an editorial on tidelands use in the Bay State. 35
The Globe urged that licensing be jettisoned from the political arena --where irrevocable licenses were regularly
declared.

The Globe quotes Chester G. Atkins (D-Concord),

chairman of the Committee, as saying that irrevocable
licenses are "very troubling ... because we are conferring
enormous powers with no real definition of what the public
interest is.,,36

The Globe wrote that tidelands will continue

to be highly politicized --"because of political pressures
which can outweigh environmental, historical and legal concerns,,3? -- until the General Court delegates all of its
licensing authority to an independent agency.

The Globe

recommended against the DEQE: "The Ways and Means proposal to
delegate all this authority to DEQE, the present licensing
agency, appears to be going too far in the opposite direction.,,38

The newspaper instead said, "[W]hat is needed is a

highly visible agency or commission, such as Coastal Management or a special Tidelands commission, able to call on technical experts as needed, but also able to make and articulate
broad policy decisions involving the balance between pUblic
and private rights.,,39 The potential for politics to influence the licensing process is evident from the highly politicized nature of tidelands licensing in Massachusetts up until
18

the new Program was put in place.
The 1983 amendments to the Chapter 91 waterways statute 4 0 incorporated many of the recommendations outlined in
the Senate Report.

still, the legal mandate of the DEQE with

regard to tidelands remained broad and vague.

The 1983

amendments were akin to an open door for the DEQE to overhaul
the regulatory program, but they did not provide specific
guidelines.
The 1983 amendments changed both the substance of the
waterways law and the procedures for issuing licenses.

First

the statute now identifies former tidal flats and submerged
lands as being within the jurisdiction of the DEQE. 4 1

Sec-

ond, a new license is required for any change in use of
licensed land and any substantial structural alteration. 4 2
Third, the DEQE was to ensure that "tidelands are utilized
only for water-dependent uses or otherwise serve a proper
pUblic purpose.,,43

This requirement was not meant to prohi-

bit any non-water dependent development; rather, any nonwater dependent projects would have to "be carried out specifically with an eye toward water-related public interests.,,44

Fourth, a pUblic hearing is required in the munici-

pality where any non-water dependent project is proposed. 4 5
The 1983 amendments thus fundamentally changed the Massachusetts tidelands licensing system.

Licensing was trans-

formed from a rubber stamp approval of any project, as long
as it was structurally sound and did not interfere with navigation,46 to a system far more protective of the pUblic's
rights in tidelands.
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The 1986 clarifying Amendments

After the 1983 amendments, developers clashed with the
DEQE over the financing of large scale development under the
stricter tidelands law.

The Boston Globe reported one such

incident on May 8, 1985. 4 7

A developer from Hull who had

proposed a ten story condominium on filled tidelands was
seeking an irrevocable declaration of his license.

up until

this point, the only way to secure long term financing was to
obtain the special legislative declaration.

The DEQE testi-

fied that such a bill would be a giveaway of pUblic tidelands. A lawyer for the developer argued in front of the
Joint Committee on Natural Resources that the project would
be unmarketable without the declaration of irrevocability.
The issue of financing projects with tidelands licenses
carne up repeatedly.

The DEQE urged the General Court to stop

declaring tidelands licenses irrevocable. 4 8

Developers and

their lawyers feared that without the declaration, banks
would not finance a project whose license could be revoked
sUddenly.

Developer Robert Kenney was quoted in the Globe as

saying, "We're not trying to circumvent [the licensing process] ... The issue is that we have to know when we get all
through we have something that is finance-able" (sic) .49
Governor Dukakis promised to veto any irrevocable bills,
in effect imposing a moratorium on them.

In order to quell

the complaints of the real estate and banking communities,
the legislature further revised Chapter 91 three years later.
The legislature passed "clarifying amendments" in 1986 to
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reassure developers, bankers and lawyers that licenses would
be "finance-able" in the absence of irrevocable bills.

The

1986 provision in the law states that
A license issued pursuant to this chapter is hereby made a
mortgageable interest lawful for investment by any banking
association, trust company, savings bank, cooperative bank,
investment company, insurance company, executor, trustee,
or other fiduciary, and any other person who is now or may
hereafter be authorized to invest in any mortgage or other
obligation of a similar nature. 50
The 1986 amendments were enacted to quell the fears of
the real estate, banking and development sectors.

This pro-

vision appears to have put to rest the issue of financing
long term projects with licenses.

Even so, developers, bank-

ers and lawyers harshly criticized the proposed draft regulations, as is discussed in Chapter 3 of this paper.

The expe-

rience of Massachusetts at this stage of tidelands developrnent should serve as a warning to other states: tidelands
licensing can be a highly politicized issue.
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Table 1

-- CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN TIDELANDS LAW AND REGULATION
IN MASSACHUSETTS

=================================================================

Date

significance

Event

Private property extended

16411647

Colonial Ordinances

1866

Chapter 91 statute
First Enacted

First waterways licensing
statute in nation.

1941

Commissioner of Public
Works v. cities Service
oil Co.

Supreme Judicial Court
rules licenses revocable
without compensation.

1940ca. 1980

Period of "Irrevocable
Licences" by the
General Court

Special conveyances by
legislature of all right,
title and interest in many
tidelands parcels.

1979

Boston Waterfront Dvpt.
Corp. v. Commonwealth

Supreme Judicial Court
rules filled tidelands
impressed with public trust
rights; grants of trust
land must continue original
public use for which grant
was made.

1983
June

Senate Committee on Ways
Report #13 on Tidelands

Recommended making licensing
process more predictable;
increasing protection of
pUblic interest.

1983

Amendments to Chapter 91

Substantive changes to the
tidelands law.

1986

Amendments to Chapter 91

Technical changes to the
tidelands law.

1986

First Public Hearing Draft
of new Chapter 91
Regulations released for
pUblic comment

Controversial regs spark
public outcry.

1989

Second Draft of new
Chapter 91 Regulations
released to public

Second draft incorporates
significant revisions

1990

Final Chapter 91 Waterways
Regulations take effect

Second draft becomes finalized; long process is over.

to low water mark, with
reserved pUblic easement to
fish, fowl, and navigate.
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CHAPTER 3
THE REGULATIONS: CONTROVERSY AND NEGOTIATION

In December 1986 the DEQE released its first version of
new tidelands regulations overhauling the tidelands licensing
system in the Commonwealth.

The 1986 Public Hearing Draft 1

of its new regulations overhauled the former tidelands regulations in both substance and procedure. 2

The DEQE scheduled

four public hearings at which to discuss the draft. 3

Depart-

ment officials invited public comment and testimony; local
newspapers, especially those in coastal communities, followed
the process closely.
A storm of protest erupted in response to the draft regulations.

criticism emerged from an assortment of groups with

a stake and interest in their impact on Massachusetts.

These

groups forced major revision of the regulations by submitting
extensive written comment to the state and generating negative press coverage of the draft regulations. 4

The final

regulations were promulgated in October 1990, nearly four
years after the first draft was released to the pUblic in
December 1986.

This chapter will begin with a brief overview

of the controversial elements of the first draft.
The second part of this chapter will examine the major
players and their influence on the regulations, as well as
general perceptions of the regulations in the press.

As the

1990 National Public Trust study noted about the Massachusetts experience,
The difficulties that the division, the pUblic and
upland owners have had in arriving at agreement on
the substantive portions of the regulations provide
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an excellent example of the inevitable conflict
between competing bona fide pUblic and private
interests in the coastal area. 5
The Architects of the Regulations

The Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
(DEQE) and the Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Office
(MCZM) were the two agencies responsible for drafting the
regulations. 6

The DEQE was the primary agency, since it was

vested with licensing authority under the law.?

The MCZM

Office was involved so that the regulations would be consistent with the Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Plan. 8
In addition, a Tidelands Advisory Commission (TAC) was convened to review internal drafts and make recommendations on
the proposed regulations. In January 1984 the General Court
passed a resolution 9 establishing TAC and directing it to
study tidelands in the Commonwealth.

The Commission was to

consist of 32 members: three Senators appointed by the President; four Representatives appointed by Speaker of the House;
and nineteen members appointed by the Governer representing
various interest groups.

In addition, the Secretary of Envi-

ronmental Affairs, Commissioner of DEQE, Director of MZCM,
Commissioner of Fisheries and Wildlife, and the Attorney General (or their designees) were directed to serve on the commission. 10
TAC's primary responsibilities were to advise and assist
DEQE and CZM staff in developing new licensing policies. 11
TAC developed a series of issue papers, addressing geographic
scope, water-dependent uses, change of uses, fee structures,
and irrevocable licenses. 1 2
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The Commission identified

priorities and key tidelands issues.

They also commented on

a number of working drafts of the regulations prepared by the
DEQE and CZM staffs.

TAC's influence was in commenting on drafts of the regulations which were circulated internally before the December
1986 Public Hearing Draft was presented.

The Commission did

not enter the public hearing fray, although several members
of TAC were simultaneously representing their own interest
groups at hearings and in written comments submitted to DEQE
and CZM staff. 1 3

Some TAC members felt that the Commission

"may not have been utilized as effectively as it might have
been in the development of the Public Hearing Draft."14
While the TAC was enormously helpful to the staffs of
the DEQE and MCZM in drafting regulations, its most important
function was symbolic and political.

The regulations had at

least had the benefit of scrutiny by a wide variety of interests represented on the Commission, and thus the state could
try to avoid the appearance of being insensitive to certain
groups.

Politicians and DEQE/MCZM staff could point out the

many interests represented by the group as indicating concensus about the regulations.

While its work was important the

Commission was also politically expedient.
The 1986 Public Hearing Draft

The ninety-three page Public Hearing Draft of the Waterways Regulations (referred to as the first draft in this
paper) was distributed for public comment in December 1986. 1 5
The draft proposed both substantive and technical changes in
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the regulation of tidelands in the Commonwealth in light of
the sweeping changes made to the Chapter 91 statute.

The

first draft proposed the following major changes in the

licensing system:
1. Expand the geographic scope of program jurisdiction to include all tidelands, whether filled or
flowed, to the seaward limit of the state's territory. section 9.03 (2).
2. Preserve and enhance water dependent uses of
tidelands by prohibiting the displacement of previous water dependent activity with non-water dependent projects (unless the water dependent use can
be continued at an acceptable alternative site).
In addition, strictly control accessory-to-water
dependent uses. section 9.04 (2).
3. Reserve Port Areas for nearly exclusive use by
marine industrial projects.
4. Require every waterfront parcel to provide continuous on-foot pUblic access along the waterfront,
even above the high water mark where applicable.
Section 9.05 (2) f).
5. Categorically prohibit new fill or structures
for non-water dependent uses in flowed tidelands.
section 9.05 (5).
6.

Raise fees. section 9.06.

7. Create Waterfront Setback Zones of 100 feet
Which, among other things must provide "free pUblic
on foot passage" in private tidelands.
section
9.05 (3) 3) d).
8. Ban dockominiums by limiting the maximum term
to one year for any contract for exclusive use of
any docking facility (with option for renewal).
Section 9.11 (1).
9. Require specific improvements for marinas which
wish to expand by more than 10 slips, including:
one toilet for every 35 berths; and one shower per
sex for every 50 berths. section 9.11. 1 6
The elements listed above are some of the major rules proposed in the first draft of the regulations.

In summary, the

regulations effectively prohibited dockominiums, created
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strict public access requirements, even in private tidelands,
and prohibited non-water dependent and accessory water dependent uses unless the use provided greater pUblic benefit than
detriment.

The regulations included a maximum of forty year

terms for licenses, and there was no provision for amnesty or
grand fathering existing uses.

The following section will

discuss how the pUblic and special interests reacted to the
proposed draft.
Marinas, Boat Yards, and Yacht Clubs

The following paragraphs discuss the boating sector, the
most effective critic of the 1986 draft regulations because
of its well financed and persuasive campaign against the
draft rules.

Representatives of boating interests argued

that the regulations were fundamentally hostile to their
businesses.

By imposing strict licensing requirements and

fees on marinas, boat yards, and yacht clubs, it was alleged
that the DEQE would destroy marginal businesses and increase
the operating costs of the remaining ones.

Ultimately, the

regulations would have the effect of shrinking access to the
water by the boating pUblic by making berths unaffordable to
more people.
One of the most controversial parts of the 1986 draft
was the section 9.11 dealing with "Commercial Recreational
Boating Facilities.,,17

The boating sector argued that the

stringent requirements would cause widespread business failures in that industry, thus severely restricting access to
the boating public.

On the other hand, some newspaper edito-

rials accused the boating sector of defending the privileges
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of wealthy boat owners. 18

The views of both critics and

supporters of the draft are reviewed in this chapter.
waterways Action Committee

Arguably the most well organized and financed group
involved in the campaign to revise the first draft of regulations was the Waterways Action Committee (WAC).

A second

coalition consisted of the Massachusetts Bay Yacht Club Association and the Massachusetts Marine Trades Association, both
represented by Attorney John W. Spillane.

It is not clear

how closely the two groups worked together or how much their
memberships overlapped, although both represented yacht
clubs, marinas and recreational boaters.
The WAC was founded by Edward J. Doherty, chairman of
WAC and president of Kingman Marine in Cataumet and Marina
Consult, "an interstate business specializing in long-term
leasing and condominium ownership of boat slips.,,19

His

organization quickly coalesced into a broad group representing about 300 marinas, yacht clubs and boat yards.

WAC hired

Boston lawyer Stanley Wallerstein, public relations firm Hill

& Knowlton, a lobbyist, and hired consultants Arthur D.
Little to write a report of the effects of the regulations on
the marine businesses it represented. 2 0

A massive letter

writing campaign to the Governor and DEQE head and other
state officals involved was also very effective. 2 1

The WAC

was opposed to several sections of the regulations because
they would cause "severe strain" to the boating community,
forcing marinas, boat yards and yacht clubs out of business

28

and thus reducing access for the boating pUblic.

The WAC,

howver, urged "reasonable modifications" to the draft, and
emphasized that they wanted to negotiate with the state to
address the boating sector's concerns. 2 2
Waterways Action Committee claimed to represent about
300 marinas, yacht clubs, boat yards and other waterdependent businesses and organizations. 2 3

specifically, WAC

was concerned with increased jurisdiction of the regulations,
increased fees, requirements that boat owners build facilities to accommodate boaters, making available boat slips to
the general public, requiring lottery or first come first
serve for distributing boat slips, mandating a one year limit
on slips, limiting terms of licenses, requiring a new license
for any structural change or change in use regradless of how
small, and increases in insurance because of forced public
access. 2 4
Doherty submitted written and oral testimony on the
dockominium issue at the final pUblic hearing on the December
1986 draft on April 15, 1987.
to DEQE officals.

Doherty defended dockominiums

According to the WAC news letter following

that hearing, Doherty
defended the dockominium concept by explaining that
long term leasing may be the only way to finance
new slips; these slips have a higher turnover than
those in a traditional marina thus giving people
more access to a slip; and dockominiums can promote
better management and maintenance ... and they provide an alternative for boaters. 2 5
Importantly, Mr. Doherty had a financial stake in the outcome
of the regulations.

Not only was he the owner of Kingman

Marine in Cataumet, he was also owner of a development firm
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specializing in the sale of dockomiums. 2 6

According to an

April 1987 soundings article, the WAC budget at that point
was $155,000 "raised from membership and underwritten by Marina/Consult" (Doherty's firm) .27

In 1988 the Boston Globe

featured Doherty in an article on dockomiumiums in New
England. 28

According to the article, Doherty is credited

with introducing the dockominium to New England.

The article

states, "In Massachusetts, the buyer of a dockominium technically purchases a 99-year lease to use the dock space.
cally, a slip sells for at least $1,500 per foot.

Typi-

Slips usu-

ally range 30 to 70 feet long, so a buyer ordinarily pays at
least $45,000 and sometimes more than $100,000.,,29

Thus

while the WAC advocated revisions to the regulations to preserve access to the waterfront by the boating pUblic, its
chairman and chief financial backer also had a significant
financial interest in the regulations.
Massachusetts Bav Yacht Club Association and the
Massachusetts Marine Trades Association
The Massachusetts Bay Yacht Club Association (MBYCA) and
Massachusetts Marine Trades Association (MMTA) also joined
forces to fight the 1986 draft regulations. While WAC sought
to have the regulations revised and moderated to accomodate
its own interests, the MBYCA and MMTA attacked the very
legality of them.
The MBYCA and MMTA were represented by John W.

Spil-

lane, an attorney from Worcester, who submitted extensive
comments on the drafts in March 1987. 3 0

His comments on

behalf of the MBYCA and MMTA hammered away at the regulations
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in two ways.

First, Spillane recommended that all provisions

be struck which were not specifically authorized in the Chapter 91 statute.

spillane repeatedly accused the DEQE of

creating its own interpretation of the pUblic trust doctrine
not included in the statutory law. 3 1
Second, in his twenty-eight pages of comments, Spillane
attacked many of the provisions as "arbitrary and capricious
and exceed[ing] all reasonable statutory authority.,,32

with

regard to Section 9.11, "Commercial Recreational Boating
Facilities," Spillane recommended that key passages of the
draft regulations be stricken because they are "overbroad and
beyond the statutory authority" of the DEQE. 3 3

In particular

Spillane said that the DEQE had no legislative authority to
charge different tidewater displacement fees for water dependent and non-water dependent uses. 3 4

Throughout his comments

Spillane attacked the fundamental legality of the regulations
and repeated the refrain that many of the regUlations were
arbitrary, capricious and exceeded the statutory authority of
Chapter 91. 3 5
Dockominiums and the Allocation of Vacant Boat Slips

Section 9.11 of the 1986 Draft Regulations, "Commercial
Recreational Boating Facilities," limited the term for a
leasing a slip to one year with the option for yearly
renewal; and required the "fair and equitable assignment from
a waiting list for use of vacant or new docking facilities.,,36

By limiting the maximum term for exclusive use of a

boat slip, the regulations effectively banned dockominium
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ownership in Massachusetts.

This ban was attacked by dockom-

inium defenders such as Doherty because it would force marinas to close one option by which owners stay in business in
difficult economic times.
The allocation of vacant slips was another one of the
most controversial and most misunderstood elements of the
1986 Draft.

The regulations required "a fair and equitable

assignment from a waiting list" compiled by date of application, lottery, size and type of vessel, or "any other method
deemed appropriate by the Department.,,37

critics from the

boating sector cited this portion of the regulations as an
example of the state interfering in local businesses.

Paul

R. Neelon, President of Hewitts Cove Marina in Hingham,
reacted to the regulation of slips this way:
[A]ssignment procedures for docking facilities are
properly the realm of private business sUbject to
the already existing laws against discrimination.
Private marina operators should be allowed to exercise discretion in assignments.
In the past few
years I have twice exercised such discretion which
would be technically illegal under the proposed
rules -- in one case, a handicapped person and the
other, a terminal illness. 38
On the other side of the issue, many perceived the boating sector as the privileged and wealthy attempting to preserve the status quo in their favor and at the expense of the
general pUblic.

The New Bedford Standard-Times published an

editorial on the draft regulations which said in part:
Big money interests and property owners who spent
big bucks for a spot near the water don't want
Beacon Hill corning down and telling them that they
have to let a pittsfield or Podunk family corne down
and be able to gain access to the waterfront and
maybe -- heaven forbid -- a mooring. These things
are treated almost as an exclusive birthright of
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some kind. 39
In addition to the Standard-Times, the Boston Globe also
hammered the critics of the 1986 draft regulations in an
April 11th editorial.

The Globe harshly criticized the

recreational boaters for joining forces with the marina,
yacht club and boat yard coalition.

The editors wrote,

[A] group of marina operators has drawn boaters
into a coalition opposing the regulations with a
well-organized campaign of disinformation.
It has
led some boaters to believe that each year they
will be assigned a mooring space by statewide lottery, some years winning one at Mattapoisett on
Buzzards Bay, but the next year forced to move
their boat to Lake Quinsigamond. 4 0
The "disinformation" accusation was heard repeatedly, and
like any rumor it is impossible to uncover its source.

It is

quite possible that instead of disinformation it was misinformation, as the regulations were not written very
clearly.41

Nevertheless the WAC denied the disinformation

accusation, instead pointing to the vagueness of the regulations as the source of confusion.
Yacht Clubs

When the 1986 draft regulations carne out there was some
confusion about how they applied to yacht clubs.

Many yacht

clubs were under the impression that they were sUbject to the
same rules as the marinas.

Section 9.02 seemed to include

yacht clubs in its definition of "Facilities of Private
Tenancy":
"Facilties of Private Tenancy" means facilities at
which the advantages of use accrue to a relatively
limited group of specified individuals (e.g. the
members of a private club, the owners of a condominium building) rather than to the pUblic-at-large
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or to a generic community of benficiaries (e.g.
patrons of a public restaurant, visitors to an
aquarium or museum) on either a transient or permanent basis. 4 2
sixty-two yacht clubs, comprising the Massachusetts Bay Yacht
Club Association, joined forces with the Massachusetts Marine
Trades Association, comprised of about 134 marinas, boat
yards and other marine facilities to battle the 1986 Draft
Regulations. 43
One of the most vocal yacht clubs was the Lynn Yacht
Club, whose Commodore Carl Hall and Secretary Robert Feener
submitted comment to the DEQE. 4 4

Hall and Feener testified

that Lynn Yacht Club was a "sweat-equity" organization -that members exchanged work at the club for boating and other
privileges.

This arrangement made yacht clubs affordable to

moderate income people.

They argued that the perception of

yacht clubs as enclaves of wealthy boat owners was out of
date.

The new regulations would thus be unfair and would put

a financial squeeze on clubs which provide access to the
water for many boaters. 4 5
other Comments on the 1983 Draft Regulations

The boating sector was not the only group which criticized the first draft of the regulations.

Developers, bank-

ers, environmentalists and conservationists, building and
engineering associations also submitted written comments to
the DEQE.

Following is a brief overview of the views of the

most important groups.
Bankers and Lawyers

The Massachusetts Bankers Association (MBA), represent-
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ing 248 commercial and savings banks, was predictably concerned with the clouding of titles of filled lands. 4 6

In a

letter to Gary Clayton, the MBA "strongly endorse[d] the
positions of" the Lawyers Committee on Chapter 91, an ad hoc
group of attorneys which submitted a lengthy comment on the
proposed Chapter 91 regulations. 4 7
The Lawyers Committee (LC) on Chapter 91 submitted a
fifteen page memorandum to the DEQE.

According to the memo-

randum, the LC consisted of twenty-one attorneys who represent owners, developers, tenants, lenders and title insurers. 4 8 Attorney Herbert Vaughan, of the law firm Hale and
Dorr in Boston, was chairman of the group.

The Committee

argued that the proposed regulations assert jurisdiction far
beyond what the statute authorizes.

Vaughan argued:

The proposed regulations seek to assert jurisdiction over areas in which the Commonwealth has
retained no rights .. There are large tracts of former tidelands in which the Commonwealth granted all
its rights and interests and which, for that reason, are not sUbject to regulation under the 1983
Amendments. 49
The Lawyers Committee on Chapter 91 criticized the proposed regulations on two points.

First, many of the tide-

lands purported to be within the jurisdiction of the DEQE
under the law are now entirely private property.

In particu-

lar, LC asserted that where former private tidelands which
have been properly filled or wharfed out, there no longer
exists the pUblic easement for fishing, fowling and navigation. 5 0

The group argued that many former Commonwealth

tidelands over which the DEQE asserts jurisdiction were
granted in fee, and the pUblic rights in such parcels were
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terminated. 51
Second, the Lawyers Committee asserted that the draft
regulations "assert a sweeping zoning-type regulatory authority for the Department, which has no basis in Chapter 91 or
any other law.,,52 This complaint, that the regulations interfere with the home rule of municipalities with respect to
zoning, echoed the sentiments of some municipal planning
boards. 5 3 Finally, the Committee argued that by limiting
terms to 40 years 5 4 the regulations would make "privately
financed significant waterfront improvements" infeasible.
This limitation on terms of licenses, Vaughan argued, would
also run counter to the 1986 Amendment to make licenses a
mortgageable interest. 5 5
The comments of Vaughan on behalf of the the Lawyers
Committee on Chapter 91 -- that the regulations overreached
the jurisdiction of the DEQE -- echoed the arguments made by
John Spillane on behalf of the Massachusetts Bay Yacht Club
Association and the Massachusetts Marine Trades Association.
Both attacked the fundamental legality of the regulations,
including the DEQE's jurisdiction over filled private tidelands. According to the 1990 National Public Trust Study,
The division has acknowledged the uncertain state
of the law surrounding filled private tidelands but
takes the position that it must in the first
instance decide doubtful issues in the pUblic's
favor and leave it to the courts to resolve the
issue. This ~osition seems both reasonable and
responsible. 5
Questions remain concerning DEQE's interpretation of its
regulatory authority under tidelands laws in the Bay State.
The DEQE, meanwhile, decided that they should err on the side
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of the pUblic by interpreting their authority under Chapter
91 liberally, and let the courts decide the issue if the regulations are challenged. 57

The DEQE thus presumes formerly

filled private tidelands and Commonwealth tidelands within
its geographical jurisdiction to be impressed with pUblic
rights unless the owner can prove otherwise.
Yet the DEQE did make a serious concessions to those who
argued that jurisdiction over filled former tidelands may be
illegal.

First, it refined its definitions of "private tide-

lands" and "Commonwealth tidelands" so that ownership in
absolute fee simple free of any easement or other burden, and
thus not subject to regulation could be proved. 5 8

Second,

jurisdiction excluded "landlocked tidelands, .. 59 thus exempting from regulation large amounts of filled tidelands.

Hun-

dreds of minor revisions and changes in wording were incorporated into the second public hearing draft of July 1989.
The second draft is essentially what became the Final Promulgated Regulations.

The primary differences between the two

versions are discussed in detail in Chapter Chapter 4 of
this thesis.
This point of contention illustrates the need for comprehensive and concise statutory language so that the regulatory agency charged with carrying out the legislative mandates will be clear in its mission.

The Massachusetts courts

will likely be the final arbitor of this issue.

The argu-

ments of legal scholars questioning the DEQE's interpretation
of its jurisdiction under the Chapter 91 statute and tidelands case law, and indeed the legal underpinnings of the
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Chapter 91 statute itself, are worthy of close examination.
Supporters of the 1986 Draft Regulations
The environmental groups came out generally in favor of
the proposed regulations, although they did not defend them
as vigorously as the marinas and boat yards attacked them.
Perhaps it was because there was some doubt that pUblic
access and environmental preservation necessarily had very
much to do with each other.

The environmental groups

appeared not able to decide whether to defend the regulations
on the grounds that they protected nature or that they fostered increased pUblic access to nature.

In fact, many see

these two issues as quite different and sometimes competing. 6 0 Nevertheless, these groups acted as important counter
balances to the strident voices opposing the regulations.
The Environmental and Conservation Groups
Several environmental and conservation groups submitted
comments to the DEQE on the 1986 draft regulations.

For the

purposes of this study, these groups are considered "special
interest groups."

The Conservation Law Foundation, the Envi-

ronmental Lobby of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Audubon
Society, the Massachusetts Association of Conservation Commissions, and the Charles River Watershed Association participated in the pUblic hearings and submitted comments to the
Commonwealth.

Predictably, they applauded the regulations

and advocated increased protection of the environment and the
pUblic's access to tidelands.
The Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) in particular
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argued that the physical boundary of private tidelands should
be the mean low water mark instead of the extreme low water
mark used in the regulations.

Citing several cases 6 1 CLF

argued for the more restricted definition of "private tidelands" under the law.

Interestingly, the regulations define

private tidelands in part as bounded by the "historic low
water mark or of a line running 100 rods (1650 feet) seaward
of the historic high water mark, whichever is farther landward ... ".62 Thus the DEQE declined to define the boundaries
of private tidelands within the regulations, leaving the
issue to judicial interpretation.
CLF also lamented the absence of strict resource protection provisions in the regulations.

Specifically, the CLF

wrote:
Of specific concern are the cumulative and longterm effects of granting licenses for many small,
usually private projects in the tidelands that permit a proliferation of activities, such as the
operation of motorboats, that tend to disturb the
productive fisheries near shore. To deal with such
long-term, cumulative threats, CLF believes that
the proposed regulations should permit the Department to reject a license application on the basis
of such cumulative impacts, both current and anticipated. 63
The Environmental Lobby of Massachusetts (ELM) and the Massachusetts Audubon Society (MAS), like the CLF, applauded the
regulations while recommending stricter controls on development and increased protection of the pUblic's rights in tidelands. ELM advocated increasing the geographic scope of
jurisdiction from 200 feet to 400 feet from the high water
mark.

ELM also advocated 25 year terms for most projects

with longer terms of fifty or ninety-nine years in certain
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circumstances. 64

The Audubon Society wrote, "However, in

improving access, it is essential that those areas of the
coast that are ecologically fragile not be inadvertantly
damaged. 1165

Finally, the Charles River Watershed Association

(CRWA) suggested that fragile areas such as Areas of critical
Environmental Concern should "receive special attention in
the determination of appropriate public use and access
requirements.

There should be some way of favoring passive,

low-impact recreational uses of these areas."66
After receiving comments from these environmental
groups, the Department decided to refrain from making deteminations based on environmental impact which would prohibit
pUblic access.

Evaluations of ecological sensitivity would

be left to other state and federal agencies whose responsibility it is is to make such determinations.
This type of provision, while certainly admirable in its
propection of the natural environment in which the public has
certain rights, would thrust the DEQE into a policy-making
role.

If the DEQE were controlling otherwise lawful develop-

ment of tidelands because of potential cumulative effects in
the future, the Department would certainly be stepping out of
its regulatory shoes.

The final regulations did not assume

this broad pOlicy making authority, and instead deferred
environmental assessments to the appropriate agencies and
legal authorities.

The regulations do require compliance

with "applicable environmental regulatory programs of the
Commonwealth" in Section 9.33 of the final regulations.
Over a thousand pages of comments on the 1986 Draft Reg40

ulations were sent to the DEQE, nearly all of them critical
to some degree.

While the players mentioned above are some

of the most important, numerous smaller participants' comments were incorporated into the second version which was
finalized in October 1990.

The well organized coalition of

boating interests, in particular, forced the DEQE back to the
drawing board in 1990.
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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF DATA

This chapter analyzes the data which was presented in

the preceeding chapters.

The study's hypotheses are individ-

ually tested in light of the research.

The analysis relies

primarily on the public comments and a comparison between the
1986 Draft and the 1990 waterways Regulations in their final
form.
Hypothesis #1: Widespread pUblic criticism caused the
state to significantly revise the original draft of
the Chapter 91 regulations.

Public criticism of the 1986 Draft Was Widespread
Hundreds of pages of written comments, the testimony of
observers and participants, and numerous newspaper articles
attest to the fact that the 1986 Draft was revised because of
criticism from many angles of the community.

One might

assume that those people who supported the regulations did
not bother to write, and so by their silence tacitly accepted
them.

still, a preponderance of the evidence supports this

assertion that pUblic criticism was widespread.
The first source of information which supports Hypothesis #1 is written testimony in the DEP files.

A close review

of the hundreds of responses to the 1986 Draft reveals a more
than 3 to 1 ratio of generally critical letters to generally
supportive letters.

The substance of the criticisms, dis-

cussed in Chapter 3, corresponds with the special interest
group of which each writer is a member.

Despite the array of

concerns, it is clear from these comments that the 1986 Draft
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was extremely unpopular among the writers.
The second source of data supporting this assertion is
the testimony of observers and participants in the public
hearing process.

Personal interviews with key participants

reveal that many people, particularly in the recreational
boating sector, were outraged over the Draft. 1

The authors

of a 1990 Maine Law Review article wrote, "curiously, few
came to the defense of the DEP's proposal.

Local and state-

wide environmental groups said little in support of the DEP's
effort.

In the wake of widespread and vocal opposition, DEP

withdrew its proposed regulations in early 1987.,,2

Dennis

Ducsik, one of the authors of the 1986 Draft, also concurred
with other observers after more than a year and a half of
public comment period:
Written comments on the public hearing draft totaled
in excess of 1000 pages ... The principal architects of
the regulations (DEQE-Waterways Director Clayton,
DEQE-Deputy Counsel Dierker, CZM Tidelands Coordinator Ducsik) have spent nearly two full months this
summer formulating appropriate revisions, with the
aim of strengthening the underlying pOlicy concepts
while reducing the alienating affect (sic) the draft
had on the development community.3
While specific criticisms varied greatly, the common sentiment was that they were unacceptable as written.

By the

state officials' admission, the extensive review and revisions were an attempt to bring about a concensus acceptance
of the final regulaitons. 4
The third and final source of evidence which supports
Hypothesis #1 is the array of items in state and local newspapers.

A cursory look at some of the headlines reflects the

contents of these articles: "Marina owners say plan will sink
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them;" "Armada: Firms aiming to torpedo tidelands rules;"
"Waterfront landowners fight changes in law;" "Attack readied
on Chapter 91;" "Coastal regs deep-sixed."5

These are just a

few of many dramatic headlines which attest to the unpopularity of the 1986 Draft Regulations.
Hypothesis #2: The widespread pUblic criticism of the
first draft came primarily from special interests
such as marinas and developers, with little participation by groups representing the general pUblic.
Special interest is defined for the purposes of this
study as a particular segment of the pUblic which has a
financial interest at stake which collides with the trust
rights of the general pUblic.

A special interest is a par-

ticular group of people who directly benefit from private use
of tidelands.

They do not represent the the general pUblic,

many of whom are citizens of Massachusetts who own no coastal
property and live inland but whose rights are protected under
the public trust doctrine.

Non-profit groups such as the

environmental groups and state agencies, which do not have a
significant financial interest at stake, are considered general interest groups.
Of the written comments examined for this study, well
over half of the letters received were from members of special interests.

Approximately 90% of the comments classified

as special interest either rejected the proposed regulations
entirely or called for serious, substantive revisions.

In

contrast, approximately half of the comments classified as
general interest were critical of the First Draft.

Of all of

the letters received, both special interest and general
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interest, 75% of the comments either rejected the draft outright or had serious misgivings about it, while only 25% generally supported the proposed regulations.

While this survey is non-scientific and did not include
many comments which are no longer in the DEQE files, the
results indicate that this assertion is supported by the
data.

The group which was most vocal in protesting the draft

regulations, the boating sector, is certainly a special
interest group.

As was discussed in chapter 3, the boating

sector --including marinas, yacht clubs, boat yards and recreational boaters --formed a powerful and well-financed
coalition in order to force a massive overhaul of the 1986
Draft Regulations.

While general interest groups such as the

Environmental Lobby of Massachusetts and the Conservation Law
Foundation defended the main provisions of the regulations,
the boating sector, in its fight to force wholesale revision
of the regulations, was better financed and in the end the
most successful special interest opposition group.6 For
example, the New Bedford Standard Times quoted the Development Director of the New Bedford-Fairhaven waterfront as saying, "People along the coastline are practically armed ... to
get some bear."7

The public hearing in Gloucester on April

15, 1987 was packed with "600 or more yachtsmen ... who were in
no mood for ... reassurances."8
Hypothesis #3: The final ChaDter 91 Regulations,
which include several major changes from the first
draft, are significantly different than the first
draft in protecting the general pUblic's interests in
trust lands in Massachusetts.
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The following paragraphs compare the 1986 Draft and the
1990 Final Regulations and highlight the major compromises
which are reflected in the differences between the two versians.
The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that the
pUblic's rights under the Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts (discussed in Chapter 2 of this paper) are the following: an easement for fishing, fowling and navigation and
their natural derivatives in private tidelands; and broader
rights, including recreational uses, in Commonwealth tidelands.
The Primary Differences Between the 1986 Draft
and the 1990 Final Regulations
The research clearly indicates that the 1986 Draft was
an unpopular foray into the world of comprehensive tidelands
regulation.

Hypothesis number one asserts that this pUblic

criticism sent the DEQE back to the drawing board to revise
the regulations.

A comparison of the 1986 Public Hearing

Draft and the 1990 Final Regulations shows that the second
version of the regulations, which was presented for pUblic
comment in 1989 and finalized in 1990, incorporated many
points of compromise which the critics of the first draft
demanded.

The following paragraphs discuss the primary areas

of compromise reflected in the Final Regulations of 1990.
I. Geographic scope

The geographic scope of the 1986 Draft was significantly
broader than that of the final regulations.

This revision

substantially reduced the area of jurisdiction of the pro-
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gram.

A variety of factors led to this change, not the least

of which was the outcry during the pUblic comment period.
The nature of the change will be discussed first, and the

impetus for the change will then be examined.
with regard to geographic scope, the final version of
the regulations are significantly weaker than the 1986 Draft.
The first version asserted jurisdiction over all "trustlands"
9, which included lands underlying Great Ponds, certain
rivers, and tidelands, including "present and former submerged and tidal lands lying between the natural high water
mark and the seaward limit of state jurisdiction.
include both flowed and filled tidelands. "10

Tidelands

The natural

high water mark was defined in section 9.02 as the tide line
as it existed before any alteration of the shoreline by filling, dredging or impounding. l l

In other words, the 1986

Draft asserted jurisdiction not only over filled tidelands
abutting the water but also over hundreds of acres of filled
landlocked tidelands.

One third of the city of Boston, for

example, which includes millions of dollars worth of development in the Back Bay area, would have been sUbject to the
program as written in 1986. 1 2
This regulatory jurisdiction is entirely consistent with
the definition of tidelands in the 1983 amendments to Chapter
91 Statute.

According to the law, tidelands include "present

and former sUbmerged lands and tidal flats held lying below
the mean high water mark."13

Furthermore, the law states

that
no structures or fill may be licensed on private
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tidelands or commonwealth tidelands unless such
structures or fill are necessary to accommodate a
water dependent use; provided that for commonwealth
tidelands said structures or fill shall also serve a
proper pUblic purpose and that said purpose shall
provide a greater pUblic benefit than pUblic detriment to the rights of the public in said lands. 1 4
From the wording of the statute it is evident that lawmakers
intended that former submerged and tidal lands might be
included in the program's bailiwick.

Thus, the first draft

asserted a large geographical scope consistent with the
directive of the law.
Complex legal arguments by groups such as the Lawyers
Committee on Chapter 91,15 along with doubts about whether
such a large geographical scope would be practical,16 led
DEQE officials to consider revising this provision in the
second draft.

The DEQE was faced with three basic options

with regard to the jurisdiction of the program.

First, the

state could maintain regulatory control over landlocked
filled tidelands as it did in the 1986 Draft.

Second, it

could create a mechanism whereby the occupier of a filled
landlocked tideland could purchase whatever vestigial pUblic
interest remained from the state to clear his title forever.
Last, the state could merely limit the regulatory jurisdiction to filled tidelands in which it was sure that a public
interest related to the original precepts of the public trust
remained.

This last option, where the state simply "ignores"

the Back Bay and other filled landlocked tidelands in its
regulations despite the much broader definition of trustlands
in the law, is the one exercised by the DEQE in the Final
Regulations.
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The Final Regulations exclude a large portion of tidelands --landlocked tidelands -- from the program's jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the Final Regulations includes

"all filled tidelands except for landlocked tidelands".17
Landlocked tidelands are defined in section 9.02 as
any filled tidelands which on January 1, 1984 were
entirely separated by a pUblic way or interconnected
ways from any flowed tidelands, except for that portion of such filled tidelands which are presently
located:
(a) within 250 feet of the high water mark
(b) within any Designated Port Area.
Said pUblic way
or ways shall also be defined as landlocked tidelands, except that portion thereof which is presently
within 250 feet of the high water mark. 1 8
The new definition of the geographical scope of the regulatory program thus significantly limits the amount of area
sUbject to scrutiny under the Chapter 91 waterways Program.
Thus any remaining vestigial public interest in filled landlocked tidelands was, in effect, given away without any public compensation.
The DEQE felt that this limit would "focus the Department's tidelands efforts"19 so that filled lands which
remained adaptable to public trust uses -- filled lands adjacent to the water -- could be more strictly regulated.

While

it is understandable that with the DEQE's limited resources
an exhaustive mapping of landlocked tidelands and the
increased workload of issuing hundreds more licenses might
have been impractical, this particular solution is less than
ideal.

By in effect giving away the public's interest in

landlocked tidelands, especially those which have been generating huge amounts of revenue for occupiers, the state lost
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the opportunity to gain some sort of compensation for the
general pUblic.

Other options, such as setting up a program

whereby landlocked real estate owners could buy quitclaim

deeds for a fee, albeit even a nominal fee, would have been
more in the pUblic interest.

The one time revenue that could

have been generated could have been used, for example, as
seed money for a Public Trust Fund.

The route taken by Mas-

sachusetts, while quelling the fears and criticisms of many,
may be a missed opportunity.
II. compensation

The fees proposed in the 1986 Draft Regulations would
have provided greater compensation to the general public than
the fees included in the Final Regulations.

The following

discussion of fees is illustrated by tables 2 and 3, which
compare proposed and finalized fees.
The first issue of the compensation provisions of the
Chapter 91 waterways Program is the fee schedule.

In the

spirit of compromise, the DEQE agreed to review the fee
schedule it proposed in the draft regulations.

The fees were

adjusted downward sUbstantially in the Final Regulations.
The occupation fee refers to the "imprint"20 of the project,
or the two dimensional area of Commonwealth tidelands occupied by the project.
for using public land.

This fee is the rent paid to the state
The occupation fees proposed in the

draft regulations were more than 50% greater for water dependent uses than those included in the Final Regulations (see
Table 2).

For non-water dependent uses, the occupation fee

proposed in 1986 was to be determined by appraisal and based
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on the full fair market value of the tideland.

The apprais-

al-set fee was changed to a fixed fee of $2 per square yard
in the Final Regulations.

The DEQE dropped the fees in

response to complaints that the fees were burdensome and
unreasonable.

For example, Edward Dinis of Fairahaven, MA

was outraged that under the proposed fees he would have to
pay $6,000 each year for a 220 slip marina he had proposed in
front of his Skipper Motor Inn. 2 1 Under the finalized fee
schedule, he pays less than half that amount.
The second type of fee is the tidewater displacement
fee, a one-time payment for the project's displacement of
tidal water in the "tidal prism,,,22 or water column (see
Table 3).

This fee was also reduced by the DEQE in the final

regulations.

For example, under the draft regulations a com-

mercial water dependent project would have paid $10 per cubic
yard of tidewater displaced; under the final regulations, the
amount is only $2 per square yard.
The two types of fees, tidewater displacement and occupation, are appropriate for the Massachusetts situation
because they account for the bifurcated nature of pUblic
trust lands in the Commonwealth.

Still, the greatly reduced

fees of the Final Regulations illustrate the serious compromise on the part of the state, and the success of the lobbying efforts of special interest groups.

The total financial

compensation to the pUblic for the private use of public
lands is, therefore, significantly lower in the Final Regulations than in the First Draft.
III. Dockominiums
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One of the most bitterly contested provisions of the
1986 Draft Regulations was the prohibition of dockominiums.
A dockominium, essentially a ninety-nine year lease of a boat
slip which is marketed as if it is a piece of real estate,
was effectively banned in the 1986 Draft Regulations.
According to the 1986 Draft, "section 9.11: Commercial Recreational Boating Facilities,,,23 the maximum term for any
exclusive slip, including a dockominium, was one year.

since

the dockominium necessitates long-term exclusive use, this
provision was hotly contested by marina owners.

Edward Doh-

erty of the waterways Action Committee, "the man who ... is
credited with introducing the dockominium concept to New
England,,,24 led the crusade against the dockominium ban in
1987.

Because of the highly effective lobbying and public

relations campaign of the WAC and other recreational boating
interests, the ban was rescinded in the 1990 Final Regulations. 2 5
What did dockominium developers like Doherty stand to
lose by the prohibition?

According to the Boston Globe in a

1990 article, even in the depressed market of 1990 dockominiums were selling for $30,000 to $70,000 for a medium sized
boat. 2 6

In the article, the DEQE is said to have estimated

that there were about 1,000 dockominiums at 17 marinas around
the state in 1990.

That would mean an average of more than

58 dockominiums per marina.

At $30,000 each, the average

revenue would exceed $1.7 million per marina.

The Globe

article states that Doherty's Kingman Marina in Cataumet
included 235 dockominiums.
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Again, at $30,000 per slip, the

dockominiums netted at least an estimated $7 million in one
time revenue for Kingman Marine and Doherty.

The revenue

raised from selling dockominiums is staggering especially

when one considers that what is being "sold" is actually publicly owned sUbmerged land.

Certainly numbers like this,

along with the speculative nature of the business, moved the
DEQE to ban dockominiums in its 1986 waterways rules. 27
Yet the DEQE did accede to pressure from the recreational boating sector.

The Final Regulations repealed the

ban and replaced it with provisions which instead put limits
on dockominium development.

section 9.38 (2) of the 1990

Final Regulations allows marinas to lease up to fifty percent
of the total berths as dockominiums as long as "said marina
provides water-related pUblic benefits commensurate with the
degree of privatization.,,28 In addition, the fees for dockominiums are based on the full fair market rental value of the
underwater land, rather than the fixed fees discussed
above. 29

Nevertheless, the DEQE's retreat on the issue of

dockominiums attests to the power of the monied boating
interests and the weakened protection of the public interest
in the Final Regulations.
III. Amnesty Provisions

The 1986 Draft Regulations did not have any grandfather
clause or amnesty program, and this set of howls of protest.
All existing uses of land within the jurisdiction of the program would have had to be re-licensed under the new rules and
fees.

Again, the DEQE acceded to pressure from special

interests and created amnesty provisions in the Final Regula53

tions.

Under the section 9.10 of the 1990 Final Regulations,

a three year amnesty window is offered for unauthorized uses
and structures which have been in place since January 1,
1984.

The provision is meant to bring into compliance as

many unlicensed projects as possible.

An amnesty license is

offered for 99 years for water-dependent use projects on Commonwealth tidelands (30 years for other types of projects),
with fees assessed according to the old schedule. 3 0 To
qualify for amnesty, the project must not have changed since
1984.

In addition, small scale water-dependent structures on

residential property, such as docks and piers, are offered
interim approval licenses which have 30 year terms and no

fees other than application fees. 3 1

The DEQE included the

new pOlicy as a result of pressures from the public and as a
way to bring as many projects into the system without having
to resort to penalties and threats.
It is clear that after analyzing the data that Hypothesis #3 is indeed true.

The dramatic shrinking of the geo-

graphic scope of the program in the Final Regulations leaves
the public interest unprotected in hundreds of acres of landlocked filled tidelands.

Some level of public interest in

these landlocked areas is assumed to remain, since both the
landmark Boston Waterfront decision and the 1983 amendments
to the Waterways Statute explicitly say so.

Nevertheless,

the public interest in filled lands which are clearly not
waterfront has not been defined or delineated by any court.
The result of this grey area of the law is that vestigial
pUblic interest in landlocked filled areas, if it indeed
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exists, is practically impossible to define for the purpose
of this type of program.

This study indicates that the DEQE

was caught between a rock and a hard place with regard to

landlocked filled tidelands, although its solution --to write
them out of the program -- may not have been in the public
interest.

On the other hand, the compromises in the form of

dockominium provisions, lower fees and the amnesty program
appear to have been included in the Final Program purely in
order to satisfy the protests of special interest lobbyists.
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-- COMPARISON OF PROPOSED AND FINALIZED FEE SCHEDULES:
OCCUPATION FEE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Annual occupation Fee in $ per square yard

Table 2

Proposed in 1987
Public Hearing Draft

Finalized in 1990
310 CMR 9.00 Regs

Non-Commercial
Water Dependent

5

1

Commercial
Water Dependent

2.25

1

Non-Water
Dependent

Appraised based on
full fair market
value of tideland
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2

Ta))le 3

-- COMPARISON OF PROPOSED AND FINALIZED FEE SCHEDULES:
TIDEWATER DISPLACMENT FEE
---------------------------------------------------------------One Time Tidewater Displacement Fee in $ per cu))ic yard

Proposed in 1987
Public Hearing Draft

Finalized in 1990
310 CMR 9.00 Regs

Non-Commercial
Water Dependent

5

2

Commercial
Water Dependent

10

2

Non-Water
Dependent

20

10
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The case study presented in the first four chapters of

this paper illustrates the pitfalls and problems which Massachusetts faced in creating a tidelands licensing program.
This chapter will highlight the important issues which
emerged from this research followed by the paper's conclusion.
Findings

1. The "public interest" must be defined at the outset
of the development of a tidelands proqramj it is matter
of policy which underlies the entire process.
One question which repeatedly surfaced over the course
of this study is, "What is the pUblic interest in this context?" The Public Trust Doctrine is a principle which exists
in order to protect the pUblic interest in trust lands and
resources; therefore, a tidelands licensing program must
answer this question in order to be cohesive and effective.
In Massachusetts, the 1983 amendments to the Chapter 91 Waterways statute gave a very broad definition of the uses which
should be considered in the pUblic interest

water depen-

dent uses, or, if non-water dependent, uses whose benefits
outweigh detriments to the public.

Massachusetts administra-

tors faced a difficult time of refining this broad criterion
within the body of the regulations.

The definitions of

"detriment" and "benefit" can be at times a very subjective.
A related question for lawmakers and regulators is, "Who
comprises the 'public'?"

Does the pUblic include the myriad

of special interest groups, or are special interest groups
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outside of the 'public'?

This question must be answered so

that criticism from groups like developers and marinas can be
given the appropriate weight in the process.

Developers have

more money to spend on a campaign against this type of program; Edward Doherty's WAC is such an example.

That does not

mean that their input is any more important than that of a
non-profit environmental group.

In Massachusetts, the DEQE

acceded on many points to pressure from the boating sector
and real estate community.

It is unclear whether the DEQE

really thought through its compromises on issues such as
dockominiums.
The last question with regard to the public interest is,
"What is the aim of this program -- a balance between public
and private interests, or an assertion of public rights in
the shore?"

In other words, the state must make a policy

decision: should we aim for a balance of public and private
rights, even in lands which are clearly public under the law,
or should we assert the public rights under the public trust
doctrine at any cost to special interests?
case is an example of the former.

The Massachusetts

Clearly, DEQE compromised

on several major issues such as fees, geographical scope, and
dockominiums.

One could argue that they reached an equili-

brium of private and public rights in the shore.

On the

other hand, one could argue as this paper does that the
state's compromises weakened the overall effect of the program.

Perhaps the DEQE submitted far reaching regulations in

1986 expecting to compromise.
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2. Compensation to the pUblic by private users of the
shore can be in many forms, ranging from physical
access across a project site to the payment of fees in
lieu of access.
When the state discusses this type of program in public
for the first time, officials should not describe the program
as a way to raise revenues for the state.

The Public Trust

Doctrine is not meant to provide state government with
another source of revenue for its General Fund.

Fees should

be payed in lieu of preferable forms of compensation such
pUblic walkways and boat launching ramps.

The fees assessed

a particular project should relate to the degree of "publicness" of the site.

If the project is water dependent, fees

should be lower than if the project is non-water dependent.
Revenue from a tidelands program should go into a fund dedicated to increasing pUblic access opportunities around the
state.

A policy of "no net loss" of pUblic access would

ensure protection of the pUblic's rights to the shore in
perpetuity.
3. Marinas, yacht clubs and boat yards provide a form
of pUblic access by their very nature. As such, they
should not be sUbject to exactly the same public access
requirements as other similar uses.
The boating sector in Massachusetts made a very convincing argument that marinas and the like provide pUblic access
to the water for a great many people relative to the area
occupied by the marina site.

They also convincingly argued

that their patrons were not only the privileged and wealthy
but primarily middle class people whose boats are their "second home" so to speak.

While it is reasonable that marinas,
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yacht clubs and boat yards be recognized for the access they
provide to a certain segment of society, they should be distinguished from an exclusive long term use such as dockominiums.

The Massachusetts Program makes such a distinction in

its regulations by levying higher fees for dockominiums.
4. The payment of fees is often symbolic as much as
cost-efficient.
The annual payment of fees reinforces with the licensee
every year the knowledge that the land private party occupies
is pUblic property (or SUbject to a pUblic easement).

Even a

token fee serves as a reminder of unique nature of tidelands.
The symbolic nature of fees is important when one considers
how the public rights in urban waterfronts have been obscured
for so many years.

Massachusetts, again, is an excellent

example of a state where the pUblic's rights in tidelands
were buried under acres of fill for decades.
5. An important consideration in creating a tidelands
program is whether the administrative agency will be
just a "landlord," or whether the agency will combine
the "landlord" function with the coastal permitting
program.
The Massachusetts Chapter 91 program combines its permitting and leasing function in its license program.

other

states have a a bifurcated system where a coastal property
owner must apply for a permit from one agency and a lease
from another.

While the licensing program provides a more

streamlined process for project applicants, this may not
practical.
6.

Expect strong opposition from groups which feel
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threatened by the mere existence of this type of program -- developers of waterfront condominiums and dockominium developers. for example.
Regardless of how many compromises are made by the

state, there will likely be a segment of the public which is
fundamentally hostile to the idea of tidelands leasing.

Mas-

sachusetts received several letters from individuals who
believed that the state was trying to steal private property
from the wealthy.

For instance, Charles Rich wrote

These changes run in complete conflict with the concept
of private ownership, profit, and motivation upon which
this country and its' [sic] economy grew as it has in
the past. There's no question this is a bad and probably illegal attempt of a one-party controlled state
administration to reap the financial income of the
marine business community under the guise of being
interested in the public benefit. 1
7. Advocacy of the general public's rights is necessary to a balanced discussion.
Massachusetts special interests were well represented in
the public dialogue over Chapter 91 because they felt they
had a lot at stake.

The greater the financial interest at

stake, the greater expenditure of time and money fighting the
proposed rules.
in these debates.

The general public can be underrepresented
The DEQE was under fire and buried in pap-

erwork and therefore was not very effective as a counterbalance to the special interests.
8. One
is that
another
defined
mized.

of the greatest concerns of special interests
a new licensing/leasing program will be yet
layer of bureaucracy. criteria should be well
and the discretion of the administrators mini-

One of the primary goals of the amendments to Chapter 91
was to minimize the unpredictablity of the application pro-
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cess.

Applicants felt that they should be given a set of

conditions at the outset and if they are met, they can expect
their application to be approved.

John Lund, a marina devel-

oper from Fall River complained that during the seven year
process of developing regulations he was repeatly required to
modify his plans to meet the public interest standards.

He

said, "If they just told me once what I needed to do to get
my application approved, I would have had this marina built
six months ago.,,2

Conclusion
The shore is a Massachusetts' most precious resource.
It is a locus of activity ranging from international trade to
catching a glimpse of the sun rising over the water.

The

Public Trust Doctrine, the common law that insures all citizens of the Commonwealth have access to the resources and
beauty of the coast, is the cornerstone of the Chapter 91
waterways Program.

The Program is one way Massachusetts pre-

serves the unique public character of tidal and submerged
lands for future generations.
The Massachusetts example illustrates the complexities
of tidelands regulation and weaknesses to guard against.

For

example, the public would be better served by a program which
poured lease revenues back into a trust dedicated to creating
or maintaining new access opportunities.

A dedicated fund

would enable the Commonwealth to aim for no net loss of
access where the pUblic could exercise its rights to fish,
fowl and navigate without interference from private individu63

also
The conclusion of this study is that while it is preferable that the process of developing a tidelands program
include an open, public dialogue, special interest groups can
shift the focus of the process.

The opposition of special

interest groups is significant because certain groups such as
dockominium developers spent large amounts of money lobbying
against the program, and thus succeeded in gaining concessions from the state.

The unorganized pUblic, on the other

hand, did not counter the special interests with a pUblic
relations campaign.

This imbalance resulted in the focus of

the discussion being shifted from public benefits to costs to
private parties.

This imbalance skews the discussion away

from the general public, especially citizens from inland Massachusetts, who deserve access to trust lands which belong to
them as much as they belong to citizens of coastal communities. A better tidelands program will invite pUblic debate
while being mindful that certain critics are often motivated
by self-interest in conflict with the spirit of the Public
Trust Doctrine.

The process would have benefitted from the

involvement of at least one advocacy group whose goal is to
protect pUblic rights to fish, fowl and navigate under the
law.

The Massachusetts Chapter 91 Program is a valuable

example to other states which seek to balance private and
pUblic interests in the coastal zone.

64

NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1 For a comprehensive and current discussion of recent jUdicial decisions regarding the Public Trust Doctrine, see
Coastal states Organization, Putting the Public Trust Doctrine to Work (Washington: U.s. Dept. of Commerce, 1990).
2 Ibid., xvi.
3 Ibid., 345.
4 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.s. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842)
clearly stated the Supreme Court's view that title to navigable waters and the lands lying beneath is held by the states,
sUbject only to the federal navigational servitude.
See also
Heather J. Wilson, "The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law," Boston College Environmental Affairs L. Rev.
11 (1984): 845.
5 Coastal States Organization, Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work, 345.
6 Coastal States Organization, Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work, 348.
7 wilson, "The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land
Law," 847.
8 Dennis Nixon, "Evolution of Public and Private Rights to
Rhode Island's Shore," Suffolk University Law Review 24, no.
2 (1990): 328.
9 Jack H. Archer, "Coastal Management in the united States
--A Selective Review and Summary," International Coastal
Resources Management Project at University of Rhode Island
(Kingston: Coastal Resources Management Center), 5.
10 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E. 2d 356 (1979).
11 William L. Lahey, Lauren Sandler Zurier, and Kenneth W.
Salinger, "Expanding Public Access by Codifying the Public
Trust Doctrine: The Massachusetts Experience," Maine L. Rev.
42 (1990): 92.
12 Coastal States Organization, Putting the Public Trust
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CHAPTER ONE

1 For general discussions of the Public Trust Doctrine, see,
e.g., Coastal states Organization, Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work (Washington: u.s. Dept. of Commerce, 1990);

Joseph J. Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law (Houston: The John
Marshall PUblishing Co., 1990); and Richard G. Hildreth &
Ralph W. Johnson, Ocean and Coastal Law (Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1983) .
2 T. Sanders, The Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1 (4th Ed.:
1867), 73, quoted in Coastal States Organization, Putting the
Public Trust Doctrine To Work (Washington: u.S. Dept. of
Commerce, 1990), 4-5.
3 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 73.
4 Anne F. Ackenhusen, "The Legal Status of Developed Tidelands in the Northeast: A Three State Sampling", Unpublished
Major Paper, (Department of Marine Affairs, U.R.I., 1984), 3.
5 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 73.
6 Coastal States Organization, Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work, 15.
7 Ibid.
8 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
9 Marine Law Institute, Managing the Shoreline for Water
Dependent Uses (Portland: University of Maine, 1988).
10 The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes, at 50 (1649)
cited in opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 685 (1974),
cited hereinafter as Colonial Ordinances 1641-1647; quoted in
Coastal States organization, Putting the Public Trust Doctrine to Work, 346.
11 Colonial Ordinances 1641-1647.
In Mass., the term "tidal
flats" refers to the land between the mean high and extreme
low water marks: "Grants under the Ordinance conveyed fee
simple title to the extreme low water mark or 100 rods from
the mean high water mark, whichever measure was further landward.
Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810)," quoted in
Coastal States organization, Putting the Public Trust Doctrine to Work, 354 (note 4).
12 opinion of the Justice, 365 Mass. 681, 685 (1974).
13 "Until 1860, the courts were the sole interpreter of the
Colonial Ordinance. Generally, the courts recognized that
the prupose of the Ordinance was to encourage and facilitate
the building of wharves. As a result, the courts allowed
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such construction even when it might diminish the common
rights of navigation and fishing" Coastal states Organization, putting the Public Trust Doctrine to Work, 346; see
also, William L. Lahey, "Waterfront Development and the Public Trust Doctrine," Mass. L. Rev.
70 (Summer 1985): 56.
14 Colonial Ordinances 1641-1647.
15 Ibid, 50.
16 "The [Austin] court[s] explicitly stated that upland
owners who built a wharf or enclosure to the low water mark
could legitimately exclude pUblic use of the wharf and underlying tidelands," Austin v. Carter, 1 Mass. 231-32 (1804),
cited in Coastal states Organization, Putting the Public
Trust Doctrine to Work, 346.
17 Coastal States organization, Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work, 347.
18 The Massachusetts state legislature is known as the General Court.
For a detailed history of the General Court, see
Cornelius Dalton, J. Wirkkala & A. Thomas, Leading the Wav: A
History of the Massachusetts General Court 1629-1980 (Boston:
Office of the Mass. Sec. of State, 1984).
19 1866 Mass. Acts c. 149.
20 Massachusetts Senate Committee on Ways and Means, "Protection of the Public Interest in Tidelands," Policy Report #13
(Boston, June 1983), 263.
21 1866 Mass. Acts. c. 149, Section 14.
22 Ibid.
23 A bill to declare and affirm a public right to "on-foot
free right-of-passage along the shore of the coastline
between the mean high water line and the extreme low water
line ... " was called unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial
Court in a 1974 advisory opinion, Opinion of the Justices,
365 Mass. 682-684, 313 N.E. 2d 563-564 (1974).
In Massachusetts, the General Court and Governor may request an advisory
opinion on a bill from the Supreme Judicial Court. Mass.
Constitution Pt. 2, c. 3, art. 11. These opinions "are not
adjudications by the court, and do not fall within the doctrine of stare decisis." Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass.
400, 177 N.E. 656, 658 (1931).
24 opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 688-689, 313 N.E.
2d 561, 567 (1974).
25 Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79 (1907).
26 Packwood v. Ryder, 144 Mass. 440, 11 N.E. 578 (1882).
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27 Anthony v. Gifford, 84 Mass. 549 (1861).
28 Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 682-684, 313 N.E. 2d
563-564 (1974).
29 Peter H. F. Graber, "The Law of the Coast in a Clamshell,
Part VI: The Massachusetts Approach," Shore and Beach (January 1982): 16.
30 In California, Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d, 491 P. 2d, 98
Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971) said that pUblic uses can change over
time. A New Jersey case, Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61
N.J. 296, 309, 294 A.2d 47 (1972), also ruled that "the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogative of navigation and fishing ... "
31 Larry Tye, "Clash of rights at water's edge," The Boston
Globe, 19 June 1989.
CHAPTER TWO

1 After the enactment of the first waterways statute in 1866
(1866 Mass. Acts c. 149) through the end of the 1970s, a
license would be given for any development which was structurally sound and did not interfere with navigation, according
to William L.
Lahey, "Waterfront Development and the Public
Trust Doctrine," 70 Mass. L. Rev. (1985), 55, 57.
2 One example of special wharfing statutes is the Lewis Wharf
Statutes, Statute 1832, c. 102; statute 1834, c. 115, section
1; statute 1835,c. 76; 1837 Sen. Doc. No. 47; Statute 1837,
c. 229; and Statute 1840, c. 18, as cited in Land Court document No. 111132.
3 In Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378
Mass. 629, 638, 393 N.E.2d 356, 361 (1979), the court reviews
the history of harbor development in Massachusetts.
4 1837 Mass. Acts c. 229.
5 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851), confirmed that
the legislature could "make reasonable regulations, declaring
the pUblic right, and providing for its preservation by reasonable restraints, and to enforce those restraints by suitable penalties" (at 95); and that "the legislature has the
power, by a general law affecting all riparian proprietors on
the same line of shore equally and alike, to make reasonable
regulations ... " affecting Commonwealth tidelands, quoted in
Coastal States Organization, Putting the Public TRust Doctrine to Work, 347.
6 Ibid.
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7 1866 Mass. Acts c. 149.
8 Dennis Ducsik, "Notes on Urban Waterfront Development and
the Public Trust Doctrine," unpublished paper, Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs, Mass. Coastal Zone Management Program, (1988), 2.
9 1866 Mass. Acts c. 149 created a permanent Board of Harbor
Commissioners to administer the licensing of projects in Massachusetts waterways. Over the years this authority has
passed through five agencies. Today, the Department of Environmental Management (formerly the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering) Division of Wetlands and Waterways
administers the licensing program. 1974 Mass. Acts c. 806,
section 8.
10 1983 Mass. Acts c. 589, sections 20-27; 1986 Mass. Acts c.
348, incorporated into M. G. L.
ch. 91, 1988 & Supplement
1989.
11 Lahey, "Waterfront Development and the Public Trust Doctrine," 62.
12 Ducsik, "Notes on Urban Waterfront Development and the
Public Trust Doctrine," 4.
13 Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378
Mass.629, 393 N.E. 2d 356 (1979).
14 Coastal States Organization, Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work,
348.
15 308 Mass. 349 (1941).
16 It is unclear where this term originated, although it
appears throughout the literature. Actually the legislature
declared that a particular license was irrevocable by enacting a special statute.
17 Lahey, "Watefront Development and the Public Trust Doctrine," 57; Ducsik, "Notes on Urban Waterfront Development
and the Public Trust Doctrine," 2.
18 Ducsik, "Notes on Urban Waterfront Development and the
Public Trust Doctrine," 2.
19 Ibid, 3.
20 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E. 2d 356 (1979).
21 Statute 1832, c. 102; statute 1834, c. 115, section 1;
statute 1835,c. 76; 1837 Sen. Doc . No. 47; Statute 1837, c.
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No. 111132.
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22 Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378
Mass.
649, 393 N.E. 2d 356 (1979).
Fee simple absolute
title includes "the greatest possible aggregate of rights,
powers, privileges, and immunities which a perosn may have in
land." C. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of real Property
29 (1962).
23 Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378
Mass.
649, 393 N.E. 2d 356 (1979).
24 Massachusetts Senate Committee on ways and Means, "Protection of the Public Interest in Tidelands," pOlicy Report #13
(Boston, June 1983), 266.
25 Ducsik, "Notes on Urban Waterfront Development and the
Public Trust Doctrine," 4.
26 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1361, 424 N.E.2d 1092.
27 Massachusetts Senate Committee on ways and Means, "Protection of the Public Interest in Tidelands," Policy Report #13
(Boston, June 1983), 266.
28 S. 1001 (1981).
29 The Senate Committee on Ways and Means wrote that the 1981
advisory opinion was a retreat from the Boston Waterfront
decision. Senate Policy Report #13, 266. The Report stated,
"In that opinion, the Court clarified, and to a certain
extent, limited the holding of the Boston Waterfront Development case with regard to the nature and extent of pUblic and
private rights in licensed tidelands." Policy Report # 13 at
4-266. Also, Heather Wilson writes of the 1981 Opinion, "The
court also implied that it would overrule its decision in
Boston Waterfront if it could." H. Wilson, "The Public Trust
Doctrine In Massachusetts Land Law," B.C. Environmental Aff.
L. Rev. 11 (1984): 855.
30 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, Mass. Adv. Sh.
(1981) 1361, 1371-1372.
31 Coastal States Organization, Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work, 350.
32 Ibid.
33 The Senate Committee on Ways and Means was charged with
investigating the status of tidelands in the Commonwealth in
preparation for amendments to Chapter 91, the Waterways Statute.
In the report the committee wrote, "Pursuant to its
responsibility to evaluate legislation which affects public
lands in the Commonwealth, the Senate Committee on Ways and
Means has been called upon to review numerous legislative
proposals on the sUbject of tidelands," 261.
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34 Senate Committee on Ways and Means, "Policy Report #13,
266.
35 Editorial, "Legislating tidelands use," Boston Globe, 24
June 1983, p.
12.
36

Ibid.

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 st. 1983 c. 589.
41 M.G.L. Chapter 91, section 1 [Definitions]: "'Tidelands',
present and former submerged lands and tidal flats lying
below the mean high water mark."
42 M.G.L. Chapter 91, Section 1 [Definitions]: "'Substantial
structural alterations', a change in the dimensions of a
principal building or structure which increase by more than
ten percent the height or ground coverage of the building or
structure or structure specified in the authorization or
license, or an increase by more than ten percent of the surface area of the fill specified in the authorization or
license."
43 M.G.L. Chapter 91, section 2.
44 Ducsik, "Notes on Urban Waterfront Development and the
Public Trust Doctrine," 4.
45 Chapter 91, Section 18 [Licenses; notice; hearings;
records]: "A pUblic hearing shall be held in the affected
city or town on any license application for non-water dependent uses of tidelands.
46 Lahey, "Waterfront Development and the Public Trust Doctrine," 62.
47 Richard Ryan, "Hull developer, lawmakers clash on regulations," Boston Globe, 8 May 1985.
48 Upon the urging of CZM and DEQE, both Governor Dukakis and
the General Court vowed to start rejecting requests for irrevocable licenses. Ducsik, "Notes on Urban Waterfront Development and the Public Trust Doctrine," 5.
49 Editorial, "The public's tidelands," Boston Globe, 27 July
1985.
50 M.G.L. Chapter 91, section 15: "A license issued pursuant
to this chapter is hereby made a mortgageable interest lawful
72

for investment by any banking association, trust company,
savings bank, cooperative bank, investment company, insurance
company, executor, trustee, or other fiduciary, and any other
person who is now or may hereafter be authorized to invest in
any mortgage or other obligation of a similar nature."
CHAPTER 3 NOTES

1 310 CMR 9.00 waterways Regulations, Dec. 1986 Public Hearing Draft. Also referred to in this paper as the "first
draft". Hereinafter cited as "1986 December Public Hearing
Draft."
2 1986 December Public Hearing Draft.
3 The four hearings were: springfield DEQE Offices, Feb. 2;
Lakeville Hospital Auditorium, Feb. 9; Gardener Auditorium at
the state House in Boston on Feb. 12. A fourth hearing was
added at Gloucester on April 15 after the pUblic comment
period was extended by the DEQE. Source: New England Offshore, "Sweeping Tidelands Regs Weighed in MA," Tom McNiff,
Jr., March '87.
4 Following are a few of the many newspaper articles covering
the 1986 draft regulations controversy: Richard Holmes,
"Armada: Firms aiming to torpedo tidelands rules," Cape &
Islands, 4 Mar.1987; Bill Kirk, "Attack readied on Chpater
91," Gloucester Daily Times, 13 April 1987; Charles McDonald,
"Coastal regs deep-sixed," [Lynn, MA l Daily Evening Item, 15
April 1987; Bob Stepno, "Marinas set to fight on Bay State
fees, public water access," Soundings, Sep. 1989, B1.
5 Coastal States Organization, Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work, 353.
6 DEQE Division of Waterways Director Gary Clayton, DEQE
Deputy Counsel Carl Dierker, and CZM Tidelands Coordinator
Dennis Ducsik were the "principal architects of the regulations." Ducsik, "Notes on Urban Waterfront Development and
the Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts," Addendum of 10
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M.G.L. Chapter 91A, s. 18; M.G.L. Chapter 91, s. 1-63; and
M.G.L. Chapter 21A, s. 2,4,8 &14.
8 M.G.L. Chapter 91.
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1231,"Resolve to establish a special commission relative to
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recommendations relative to the residual rights in landlocked
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lands, criteria for granting irrevocable licenses, changes of
use of tidelands, policies regrading future filling of tidelands, the private and pUblic development of tidelands in
both submerged and tidal flats, lands up to the historic high
and low water marks, all lands filled before the effective
date of this resolve, pUblic access, pUblic purpose and the
public trust doctrine.
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assess, and make recommendations regarding regulatory procedures for granting licenses to include fees, leases, pUblic
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35-46.
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Waterways; also directed by Senate Resolve No. 1231, lines
32-33.
12 TAC binder of Clayton.
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on the TAC according to his correspondence to Mr. Philip
Goodwin, Quincy Boat and Engine Co., July 12, 1989, although
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14 Correspondence, Donald L. Connors, Esq. to Gary Clayton,
12 March 1987. From the files of the DEQE. All correspondence cited hereinafter is from the DEQE files unless otherwise noted.
15 1986 December Public Hearing Draft.
16 These provisions were culled from a close examination of
the 1986 December Public Hearing Draft.
17 1986 December Public Hearing Draft.
18 For example: Editorial, "Coastline protection for all,"
Boston Globe, 11 April 1987; Editorial, "Our view: Coastal
access rules step on privileged toes, draw fire." New Bedford
Standard-Times, 24 Feb. 1987.
19 Richard Holmes, "Armada: Firms aiming to torpedo tidelands
rules," Cape & Islands, 4 Mar. 1987.
20 Ibid.
21 Form letters were distributed to the boating pUblic by
WAC; individuals signed them and sent mailed them to Governor
Dukakis, state legislators, Gary Clayton, DEQE Director of
Wetlands and Waterways. The forms read in part: " ... The proposed regulations are disastrous to marinas, yacht clubs and
boat yards throughout the Commonwealth, and ultimately, will
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marine community throughout the Commonwealth." Correspondence, Charles Petine to Governor Dukakis, Mar. 16, 1987.
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sink them," Boston Globe, 25 Mar. 1987; Richard Holmes,
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Times, 4 Mar.
1987; Scott Withiam, "Boatyard owners prepare
for DEQE hearing," The [Marion, MAl Sentinel, 1 April 1987,
e.g.
23 "WAC Newsletter #9," April 24, 1987 published by Hill and
Knowlton, Inc., Boston, MA.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Robert Lowe, "AND NOW ... DOCKOMINIUMS --Marinas add their
boat slips to the condo-conversion trend," Boston Globe, 25
November 1988.
27 Soundings, April 1987, "New Mass. permit plan may curtail
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aiming to torpedo tidelands rUles," Cape Cod Times, 4 Mar.
1987.
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29 Ibid.

30 Correspondence, John W. Spillane, Esq. to Gary Clayton,
DEQE Director of Wetlands and Waterways, 12 Mar. 1987, tewnty-eight pages of comments.
31 In his letter Spillane wrote, liAs previously discussed,
the primary and unauthorized land use decision making responsibilities assigned by the DEQE in the proposed regulations,
in areas where the DEQE has no genuine expertise, will be
found to be duplicative and extremely wasteful of public
funds and a violation of Home Rule." Ibid.
32 For example, Spillane recommended that all three public
purpose standards be eliminated. Correspondence to Gary
Clayton, Director of the Division of Wetlands and Waterways,
11 Mar.
1987, pp. 19-22.

33 Ibid, 26.
34 Ibid, 23, no. 2: liThe DEQE has also abused its legislative
directive by qualifying fee determination on tidewater dis75

placement, based on water dependent and non-water dependent
uses. Sec.
21,22, and 23 gives [sic] no such discretion.
35 Ibid.
36 1990 Final waterways Regulations, 310 CMR (.00, section
9.11 (1) (a). Hereinafter cited as 1990 Final Waterways Regulations.
37 1986 Public Hearing Draft, Sec. 9.11 (1)

(a).

38 Correspondence, Paul R. Neelon, President of Hewitt's Cove
Marina, to Gary Clayton, DEQE Director, Division of Wetlands
and Waterways, 7 April 1987.
39 Editorial, "Our view: Coastal Access Rules Step on Privileged Toes," New Bedford Standard-Times, 24 Feb. 1987,
40 Editorial, "Coastline protection for all," Boston Globe,
11 April 1987.
41 Mrs. A. Homer Skinner of Marblehead wrote to DEQE to
complain, "[T]hese regulations need extensive revision in the
interest of clarity.
I have read many many different regulations promulgated by federal and state agencies and never
have I had such a difficult time extracting the intent and
meaning as in the case of these Regs which are in places
vague, in places verbose and often opaque." Correspondence to
Gary Clayton, Director of the Division of Wetlands and Waterways, Mar. 16, 1987.
Even the New Bedford standard-Times,
highly critical of the opponents of the regulations, wrote,
"The DEQE, in classic fashion, hurt its case by hammering
together a proposed set of procedures that has made everyone
dizzy ... " Editorial, "Our view: Coastal access rules step on
privileged toes, draw fire," 24 Feb. 1987.
42 1986 Public Hearing Draft.
43 correspondence, spillane to Clayton, Mar. 12, 1987.
44 correspondence, Carl Hall, Commodor of the Lynn Yacht
Club, to Gary Clayton, 12 Mar. 1987.
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46 correspondence, David. E. Floreen, Vice President, Government Relations, Mass. Bankers Assoc., to Gary Clayton, DEQE
Div. of Wetlands and Waterways 12 Mar. 1987.
47 Correspondence, Herbert W. Vaughan, Esq., Chairman of the
Lawyers Committee on Chapter 91, to Thomas F. McLoughlin,
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51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 For example, town officials from Newbury and Bourne
expressed typical concerns that the regulations would remove
traditional "home rule" with regard to harbor ordinances and
waterfront zoning requirements. Correspondence, Edwin H.
Sternfelt, Harbormaster, Town of Newbury, to Robert Alvarez,
DEQE Licensing Engineer, 18 Mar. 1987; T.W. Kingman, Chairman, Town of Bourne Shore and Harbor Committee, to Gary Clayton, Director, DEQE Division of Wetlands and Waterways, 12
Mar. 1987.
54 Correspondence, Vaughan, to Clayton, 11 Mar. 1987.
55 M.G.L. Chapter 91, Sec. 15.
56 Coastal States organization, Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work, 352.
57 John Simpson, Environmental Analyst, DEQE Division of
Wetlands and Waterways, interview by Jane McNally, May 1990.
58 The draft definition (310 CMR 9.00 Drfat Regulations
December 1986) defined private tidelands in the following
way: " ... those tidelands not defined as Commonwealth tidelands in 9.02 Private tidelands are held by private parties
other than the Commonwealth sUbject to an easement which
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over and through the water." The final regulations revised
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such tidelands are not sUbject to said easement of the public" (310 CMR 9.00, 1990, at 170).
The definition of Commonwealth tidelands was also amended
to allow for special circumstances. The 1986 draft definition asserted that all Commonwealth tidelands were presumed
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or filled tidelands within Designated Port Areas.
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of Wetlands and Waterways, 12 Mar. 1987.
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